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Abstract: The process of globalization that has taken place since the 
second half of the 20th century has allowed human beings to reach the 
ends of the Earth and to explore the planet in its most radical finitude. 
Experience has revealed the enormous environmental disasters, increas-
ingly frequent, suffered by the planet and the humanity, as well as the 
grotesque inequalities between societies and the great harm to biosphere 
and other living beings that we are causing. The individualist ethics that 
has prevailed until today has been, obviously, conditioned by the dynam-
ics imposed by forms of production and distribution of natural resources: 
the economy. This paper reviews the evolution of thought in ethical 
discipline during recent decades. It presents new paths of ethics emergence 
such as bioethics, converging with approaches to ecology; namely, eco-
ethics.
Keywords: bioethics, eco-ethics, global crisis, proximity, reciprocity, 
anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, social ecology, principle of 
responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A CONVERGENCE  
OF ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND GLOBAL BIOETHICS
The second half of the 20th century has witnessed increasingly evident 
negative effects generated by the technological and industrial society, on 
a local and global scale. The terror of annihilation of mankind by a hy-
pothetical nuclear war, the horrific medical experiments during the Nazi 
regime, the accelerated deterioration of rivers, sea and land by industrial 
pollution, intensive farming and the increasing gap of inequalities between 
developed and developing countries, due to the globalization of the 
economy, among other consequences, led to the emergence of social 
movements. The public debate on these issues has involved actors from 
many different disciplines, such as biologists, ecologists, doctors, econo-
mists, lawyers, sociologists and philosophers. In this social and political 
context, at the end of the sixties and early seventies, applied ethics prolif-
erated in academic milieus. Bioethics and environmental ethics recognized 
a common historical origin but later diverged because of academic spe-
cialization. At that time, the increasing socio-ecological global crisis was 
calling to build up a disciplinary convergence towards a global bioethics, 
or eco-bio-ethics, that would comprehend and cultivate the interdepen-
dence among individual ethics, social ethics and ecological ethics.
Ethics is an activity of public deliberation about the good life in the 
political community. Nowadays, ideas on ethics, life itself and life in 
community need to be revised, since civilization is dominated by a socio-
economic globalization without any ethical-political control, deeply 
hurtful to nature and socially unequal. Max Weber stated the idea, later 
on postulated by Hans Jonas and by Karl-Otto Apel, that an individual 
ethical conscience is not enough. Indeed, an ethical responsibility towards 
the future is imperative: a macro-ethics for the planet, which must con-
sider the long-term effects of our collective action.
The word “ethics” comes from the greek word “êthos” which origi-
nally meant “abode” and “homeland”. Then it took the sense of “how 
to behave” with oneself and others, i.e. habits or customs. The word 
“oikos” also meant management of the family and home property: prefix 
from which the words “economy” and “ecology” are derived. The word 
“nomos” meant practice of rule. Faced with the dominant culture of 
global capitalism, where the economy, that is to say the rules of produc-
tion and distribution of resources (oikos and nomos), are placed before 
the logic (logikós) with which works our planetary home (oikos) harbour-
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ing human and nonhuman life (bios), ethics nowadays is to be guided by 
its original sense. As a defining practice of humanity, ethics means to 
deliberate on how to behave appropriately with oneself and the other. It 
is in this sense that the ethics of bios (bioethics) and the ethics of oikos 
(ecoethics) converge.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Most scholars of environmental ethics make references to one of the 
seminal texts on the ethics of nature, Sand County Almanac, contained 
in a book entitled Land Ethic, published in 1949 by the North American 
forest engineer Aldo Leopold (1887-1948). In the conclusions of this 
book, Leopold starts from the premise that ethics, in the course of his-
tory, has expanded the boundaries of the moral community to eventu-
ally include every human being as an end in itself: a human with an in-
trinsic value. But until now modern society has held the belief that Earth 
is a commodity or an object with an exclusively economic value, or an 
extrinsic value. Leopold argues that we are overlooking a substantial, 
ecological and social fact: that human beings are also members (and co-
dependent) of a wider community than the exclusively human one: the 
biotic community1 (Leopold, 1949).
It was V. R. Potter who coined the neologism2 bioethics. Being one 
of the founders of the discipline, he considered Leopold as a pioneer who 
“anticipated the extension of ethics to bioethics” in the dedication of his 
major book: Bioethics. Bridge to the Future (1971) (Potter, 1971). 
Some time later, Potter began to use the term “Global Bioethics” to 
1 A “biotic community” – concept created by the ecologist Karl Möbius in the 
second half of the XIXth century – is a balanced partnership of organisms of different 
species, both animal and vegetation, which live and breed in certain conditions of a 
medium or biotope. (See Deléage, JP [1993]. Historia de la ecología. Barcelona, 
Icaria: 82-86).
2 In recent years, it has been acknowledged that the original author of this expres-
sion was the Protestant theologian Fritz Jahr (1895-1953), who published in the 
journal Kosmos in 1927 an article entitled “Bio-ethics: an analysis of ethical relations 
humans with animals and plants”, in which he proposed the Universal Bioethical 
Imperative, which asserts: “Respect for every living being as an end in itself and to 
treat it, if possible, as an equal” (See Sass, H M. “Fritz Jahr’s 1927 Concept of Bioeth-
ics”, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol 17, No. 4, Dec., 2007, pp. 279-295).
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express an ethics that incorporates biological and objective knowledge 
for the survival of the human species, which is compatible, on one hand, 
with the symbiotic relationships of a diversity of species and, on the 
other, with the various ethnic populations that live and coexist in condi-
tions of dignity, equality and health, within the context of civil societies 
(Potter, 2001).
The ideas of the French-German physician, philosopher and protestant 
theologian, Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965), were another source of in-
spiration for environmental ethics. He formulated an ethical mysticism 
based on “the reverence for life”, founded as he said “in the most im-
mediate, sensitive and comprehensive fact that ‘I’m living and want to 
live in the midst of living beings who want to live’” (Schweitzer, 1923).
The ecologist and anti-nuclear activist, Barry Commoner, in his book 
The Closing Circle. Nature, Man and Technology (1971), argued that 
the origin of the planetary ecological crisis was due to failure to adjust 
between the biosphere and the human techno-sphere. “We have broken 
out of the circle of life, converting its endless cycles into man-made, linear 
events: oil is taken from the ground, distilled into fuel, burned in an en-
gine, converted thereby into noxious fumes, which are emitted into the 
air. At the end of the line is smog. Other man-made breaks in the eco-
sphere’s cycles spew out toxic chemicals, sewage, heaps of rubbish-testi-
mony to our power to tear the ecological fabric that has, for millions of 
years, sustained the planet’s life” (Commoner, 1971: 5).
In the seventies the international debate on the environmental crisis 
begins. In 1972, the United Nations hold the Stockholm Conference on 
Human Environment. Declarations addressed issues such as intergenera-
tional justice, population growth, and stressed the necessity for national 
and international cooperation, presenting the situation of developing 
countries in relation to the environment. In the same year the Club of 
Rome Report, Limits to Growth, was also published. Written by experts 
of the MIT (Meadows et al.), it opened the discussion about sustainable 
development (Meadows et al., 1972). The report raised the argument that 
the exponential growth of world population, food production, industri-
alization, pollution, as well as the use of non-renewable resources is not 
sustainable on a finite planet whose natural resources have a limited capac-
ity of absorbing contamination and whose self-regulation of the biosphere 
cycles is restricted.
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THE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL GLOBAL CRISIS
The world population grew four times during the 20th century, from 
a figure of 1.6 billion to 6.1 billions people, while the production increased 
17 times. Since the middle of the 20th century to the present day, more 
than a fifth of tropical forests have been lost, with tens of thousands of 
plant and animal species; the desertification has increased and the acidifi-
cation of forests and lakes; the greenhouse effect in the atmosphere has 
also increased dramatically, and the ozone is substantially reduced, among 
other ecological disasters (Duarte, 2009).
According to Living Planet (2008), humanity consumes 30% more 
resources than nature produces annually, exceeding the Earth’s 
biocapacity,3 although only the 20% of the population (rich countries) 
consumes 80% of the resources (WWF, 2008).
The ecological footprint index, which measures human’s demand 
on the Earth’s ecosystems and its environmental impact, is a further 
evidence of these inequities.4 Between 1960 and 2000 the global eco-
logical footprint grew by 80%, exceeding the Earth biocapacity 
limit by approximately 20%: in fact, the limit had already been crossed 
in 1980. The ecological footprint per capita available on Earth is 1.7 
hectares, yet we have reached 2.3 hectares. Countries of high income 
reach a footprint of 6.54 per capita on average (9.6 hectares in the 
United States). The upper middle income countries and the lower 
middle income countries have an ecological footprint per capita that 
has come to 2.66 and 1.73 hectares respectively (in China, 2.1 hect-
ares). Finally, the lower income countries do not even reach the 0.91 
hectares per capita: in India, it is 0.8 (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). 
These figures show that, in terms of resources and environmental 
services, rich countries of the north live off the ecological space of the 
South’s poor countries.
3 Biocapacity refers to the ability of a biological specific productive area to generate 
a regular supply of renewable resources and absorb the waste resulting from its con-
sumption.
4 “The ecological footprint is a measurement that compares rates of human resource 
consumption and waste generation with the biosphere’s rates of resource regeneration 
and waste assimilation, expressed in terms of the necessary area to maintain these flows. 
Ecological footprints represent the biologically productive space required to produce 
the resources and absorb the wastes of a given population, organization, or product 
using prevailing management and technology” (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996).
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In addition to the unequal distribution of resources, the ecological 
damage is also due to predacious economic abusers, like the U.S., Europe 
and Japan, where the global ecological exchange is unbalanced. Global 
warming affects everyone, but not all contribute equally to its generation. 
The extractive first world economies utilize large amount of commodities, 
most of which are located in the Southern Hemisphere, leaving these 
territories not only environmentally damaged and uncompensated, but 
with their social tissue deteriorated by underpaid labour and public health. 
The abuses of those economies in regard to ecological trading of goods 
and services are also unequal, since resources non-or not easily renewable 
(for example, mineral or forestry resources) are exchanged for highly 
manufactured products or services that can be produced quickly and 
without large environmental costs (Martínez Alier, 1998).
However, most countries which benefit from this global economical 
unstoppable growth are not safe from its harmful effects. This is evidenced 
by the corrected GDP indexes, which measure the quality of life. They 
indicate that beyond a certain threshold, the growth does not contribute 
to economic wealth nor to human welfare, turning out to be counter-
productive (Ekins, P & Max-Neef, M (ed.), 1992). At the end of the 
eighties, the ecological economist H. Daly proposed the Index of Sustain-
able Economic Welfare and showed that in the U.S.A, between 1950 and 
1976, it had grown by 43%, had decreased by 12% in 1988 and then 
started increasing again (Daly & Cobb Jr., 1989).
It goes without saying that not enough is done to make technological 
adjustments, increasing legal regulations or promoting environmental 
education to overcome the global socio-ecological crisis. Aiming towards 
a reform of the social, cultural and moral development of our societies 
should be a priority, along with promoting a better redistribution of 
resources - less consumption, less hoarding- and better support for suffi-
ciency.
THEORIES OF THE VALUE
ISSUES WITH FUTURE GENERATIONS AND MORAL PATIENTS
Ethics is an exclusive practice of man: it is not an affair of nature, since 
nature doesn’t ponder. If human beings have the ability to be rational 
moral agents who evaluate circumstances, make decisions and assume 
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their obligations and responsibilities, does a moral community consist 
exclusively of the reciprocal interrelationships among moral agents? Not 
necessarily. Let’s note that some humans will never be able to reach the 
ethical capacity of deliberating (those with severe mental handicaps) and 
others will lose it during the course of their life (elderly dementia and 
people in vegetative conditions), while, if everything goes well, children 
will eventually come to exert this ability. Nevertheless, they should be 
considered morally relevant, with the same rights as healthy adults, only 
not in the condition of moral agents, but rather as moral patients. A 
moral patient is understood as a human being beneficiary of the moral 
agent’s conduct, yet unable to demand rights or assume obligations. In 
fact, moral patients generate obligations of respect and care by the agent 
because of their vulnerability. From an ethical point of view, this leads 
to asymmetrical, and therefore non-reciprocal, relationships.
Similarly, if we think that capabilities, vulnerabilities and needs of 
future generations will not be different from ours, then they should be 
affected by our present acts. It seems unreasonable to treat them differ-
ently, morally speaking, because their birth has not yet occurred. Con-
sequently, future generations should also be considered moral patients.
Thus, two issues emerge: (i) the issue of proximity, that sets up consid-
erations towards people distant in time (future generations) or towards 
people distant in space, and (ii) reciprocity between moral agents and 
moral patients that involves the scope and valuation of non-reciprocal 
duties that the former have towards the latter. Thus, proximity and 
reciprocity are key concepts to designing a global ethics that considers 
the value of justice towards moral patients.
ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Beyond the moral concern for all human beings, present and future, 
could there be non-human beings who may also deserve to be included 
in our moral community because their vital interests are an end in itself? 
The Kantian ethical anthropocentrism denies that possibility, arguing 
that only humans deserve respect because they are the only beings with 
dignity or intrinsic value. Another ethical anthropocentrism, more prag-
matic, argues that it makes no sense to assign intrinsic values to nature, 
which would require dubious metaphysical proofs, when the substantial 
aim is to articulate practical methods of caring for nature (B. Norton, A. 
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Weston, A. Light & E. Katz, A. de Shalit). This perspective, called pru-
dential anthropocentrism or weak anthropocentrism (in contradiction 
with a strong anthropocentric tradition of understanding nature as a mere 
economic mean to satisfy our purposes), is an environmental ethics cen-
tered on human beings but without implying abuse or exploitation of 
nature. It insists on the fact that nature’s value is extrinsic, that it should 
be minded for its instrumental values (e.g. scientific or bio-genetic resource) 
or for recreational means, whereas truly respecting nature should mean 
to be aware of and to glorify its intrinsic values, such as its aesthetic or 
spiritual values.
To summarize, the premises on which the ethical anthropocentrism 
rests are: (i) ontological: the Kantian’s postulates according to which the 
ontological abyss between humans and the rest of the living world is 
unbridgeable, and (ii) epistemic: the Kantians, like the pragmatists, oper-
ate with a constructivist epistemology, such as they may be against sub-
stantial and objective values in nature, considering that humans are the 
only measure of value in the world; therefore, they argue that non-human 
life is not good by itself.
The humanist ethical anthropocentrism approach (see Passmore, 1974 
and Ferry, 1994) argues against the need for a new ecological ethic. Bear-
ing in mind that the Deep Ecology of A. Naess makes a very hasty review 
of the tradition of our so-called enlightened rationalism, an ecologic 
mysticism, irrational and dangerous for democratic societies, Passmore 
suggests that there is no need for a new ethics, but it is necessary to rein-
terpret our humanistic tradition and redirect its original values (prudence, 
non-arrogance, non-maleficence, etc.) towards the care of nature. We 
should, from there on, seek a middle ground between ecological extrem-
ism, which aims to preserve unspoiled nature, and a predatory technoc-
racy of natural resources, useful to man (Passmore, 1974).
Biocentrism in ecological ethics
Thousands of species have been disappearing at an inappropriately 
rapid rate, from anthropogenic causes. The non-anthropocentric ethics 
which comprises biocentrism and ecocentrism, counter-argue that the 
fostering of the planet’s biodiversity and ecosystems is only sometimes 
a duty consistent with values centered on human interests. Therefore, 
defending intrinsic values makes sense. However, the big flaw of the 
non-anthropocentric posture lies in how to prioritize the intrinsic value 
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of the entities belonging to the moral community, in cases of conflicts of 
interest.
For Peter Singer (Animal Liberation, 1975), what matters morally is 
the experience of pleasure or pain of all those affected by an act, and not 
just the sentient animal, individually considered. Consequently, there 
would be no difference between killing a human being or an animal. 
However, Singer eventually changed his statement towards making dis-
tinctions between conscious beings: nonhuman sentient beings and self-
aware beings. Under this new approach, to kill a being who has a prefer-
ence for a long life is worse than killing a being unaware of this preference, 
if there should be any conflict of interest (Singer, 1979).
To this thesis, in line with the proposals of the restricted biocentrism,5 
Tom Regan objected, arguing on a Kantian deontological basis, in defense 
of the rights of animals. Regan considered that in this case some beings 
would be only ends in themselves –for example, humans (Regan, 1983). 
The most discussed issues were the “animal rights” and the uncertain 
respect as to which of the nonhuman animals are “subjects-of-a-life”.
Also in this deontological train of thought, one of the first philoso-
phers to raise the issue of “animal rights”, J. Feinberg (1974), went a 
step further and set a wider moral criterion: “conative life”, meaning 
that life has conscious wishes, desires, and hopes; urges and impulses; 
unconscious drives, aims and goals; latent tendencies, directions of 
growth, and natural fulfillments (Feinberg, 1974). For this reason some 
argue that not only animals should be included within the moral com-
munity. In this line of biocentrism, P. Taylor (1981) advocated respect 
for all forms of life, assuming a modality of biocentric egalitarianism 
and postulating the assignment of rights to all beings based on deontol-
ogy (Taylor, 1981).
That is why some biocentrists such as R. Attfield focused on develop-
ing a hierarchical theory of value that estimates, on one hand, the moral 
consideration, in that the living being, though he may not necessarily be 
the bearer of its rights, should be a concern of the moral agent’s because 
of its intrinsic value; and, on the other hand, the moral significance, that 
is the priority or hierarchy granted to living beings when, during conflicts 
of interest, moral judgments emerge (Attfield, 1995). The basic needs of 
5 Restricted Biocentrism includes all the theories that give moral consideration 
only to some living things. In the beginning, Singer and others considered all sentient 
animals morally.
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the contemporary and future human beings are above the needs of other 
beings, in the case of a conflict of interest.
The philosophy of life and ethics of responsibility developed by the 
philosopher Hans Jonas largely shares Attfield’s postulates on environ-
mentalist philosophy (Jonas, 1966). The value of human freedom is the 
result of the evolution of life and it becomes an ontological responsibility 
to care for oneself and for the world.
Ecocentrism or holism in environmental ethics
The most radical turning point in environmental ethics took place 
with ecocentrism, or holism. These approaches point out that it is impos-
sible to build an environmental ethics without a foundation in systems 
considered integrally: biotic communities, ecosystems and the biosphere 
in their quality of holders of existing individual entities and species. One 
of the most extreme positions was defended by J. B. Callicott, who, by 
holding a radical approach of Leopold’s Land Ethic and following the 
ideas of the ethical emotivism of David Hume and Adam Smith, proposed 
a critique of conventional philosophy. He premised new ethics and new 
metaphysical paradigms that criticized the thesis of animal welfarism, 
including the movement for animal liberation of Singer, and Regan’s 
animal rights movement, considering them as an extension of traditional 
ethics and not as a plausible alternative to ecological ethics. According to 
Callicott, a real “environmental ethics bases the ultimate value in the 
biotic community and assigns different values to beings [...] and inanimate 
entities such as oceans, lakes, mountains [...] which have more value than 
individual animals” (Callicott, 1989).
From the beginning, however, the thesis of another pioneer, H. 
Rolston III, postulated a convergence between holism and individualism 
with a hierarchical theory of value. His approach placed human beings 
at the pinnacle of the scale of intrinsic values, for their ability to recognize 
values, thus bearing the responsibility of caring for the Earth. The ho-
listic dimension of Rolston’s thesis posits that the appropriate level of 
assessed interest in life exists within all species, each carrying the genetics 
of its species and therefore suitable for the survival of the individual 
(Rolston, 1988).
One of the most popular interpretations of holism is the Deep Ecol-
ogy, founded by the philosopher A. Naess, that proclaimed an ecological 
worldview and a movement of conscious transformation he called 
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“ecosophy”. His ideas were first proposed in an article, published in 1973, 
which made the distinction between the “superficial ecology movement” 
and the “deep ecology movement” (Naess, 1973).
SOCIAL ECOLOGY
Social ecology admits several approaches: social libertarian ecology, 
environmental justice movement, environmentalism of the poor and 
ecofeminism. They have in common to be outside the discussion of an-
thropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism, because they encompass ethi-
cal and socio-political topics. They are positioned beyond the distinction 
between superficial ecology movements (environmentalists) and deep 
ecology (radical environmentalism). In general terms, the thesis defends 
that ecological problems are rooted in social problems and these can be 
critically analyzed through the natural and human ecology.
Murray Bookchin advocates for a political ecology based on an eco-
logical science discourse combined with anarchist ideas. He began by 
leading a frontal attack against Deep Ecology, objecting that individual 
transformation and the conservation of nature would be the right way 
to overcome the problematic. He then proposed a socio-political trans-
formation to achieve a more dignified life and a non-exploitative relation-
ship with nature. According to Bookchin, the ecological crisis is a conse-
quence of the forms of domination between people in highly hierarchical 
societies. He believes the restructuration of social dominations to be 
primordial if the problem of nature’s exploitation is ever to be solved. 
To do so, he proposes the alternative of creating small self-sufficient eco-
communities: bioregionalism (Bookchin, 1982).
Also, Indian activist R. Guha undertook a strong critique towards 
Deep Ecology in the eighties. In poor countries, says Guha, the ecologi-
cal problem does not depend on a radical conservation of nature, but on 
resolving social conflicts between the “people of ecosystems” –that survive 
on their local resources and pollute very little– and powerful corporations, 
consumers of natural resources in large areas and responsible for strong 
and damaging environmental impacts (Guha, 1995).
The ecological economist J. Martínez Alier has further elaborated this 
approach and called it “Ecology of the Poor”. This environmentalism is 
born of environmental conflicts (local or global) caused by private or state 
appropriation of communal natural resources, thus affecting the emaci-
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ated and most disempowered populations. The focus, according to Mar-
tinez Alier, is on establishing a link between political ecology, defined as 
the study of ecological distributive conflicts, and the environmental 
economy, defined as the study of classical economics ecological unsustain-
ability (Martínez Alier, 2004).
CONCLUSIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS CARING  
FOR VULNERABLE BEINGS
After reviewing the various theories surrounding environmental eth-
ics the impression that none of them is sufficient to address the ecological 
crisis remains: first, due to the crisis between the social system as a whole 
and the biosphere’s system, and, secondly, given the internal crisis of 
global society caused by socio-ecological inequities.
To offset these theoretical slants a brief outline for a theory of mul-
tiple approaches in environmental ethics is proposed, consisting of: 1) A 
Framework Principle: the principle of responsibility and care for vulner-
able beings, 2) the derivational principles, 3) the strategic principles and 
practical principles which ensure the derivational principles, and, 4) The 
ecological citizenship for a sustainable society.
We assume that the principle of responsibility in caring for vulner-
able beings, a concept borrowed from H. Jonas, is a good framework 
to start with, because despite its breadth it allows the perspective of an 
ethics that worries about fostering vulnerable contemporary and future 
human beings, as well as the care for other beings, namely, environmen-
tal ethics. It is a principle that is guided by an anthropological finitude 
and the idea of the fragility of life, defined by Jonas as “the care for, 
recognized as a duty towards other beings, given the threat of its vulner-
ability, becoming its ‘concern’”[28]. The responsibility for the care of 
other beings is characterized by its non-reciprocity, since it is held toward 
beings with no rights because they don’t exist (future beings) or because 
they don’t have the ability to exert those rights (i.e. the non human liv-
ing beings).
Principles derived from the Framework Principle are: the principle 
of global economic and ecological justice, the principle of justice towards 
future generations and the principle of life care in the biosphere [29].
The strategic principles and practical application through policies agreed 
between countries at different stages of development are conceived as 
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   212 26/07/13   08:31
213LECAROS
ECOLOGICAL ETHICS: THE ROADS OF RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS
GLOBAL BIOETHICS
intermediate principles aimed at preserving the integrity of derivational 
principles. These principles are: sustainability, precaution, solidarity and 
common but differentiated responsibility.
The current political theories are aware that sustainable societies, 
whether operating with technological adjustment policies (environmental-
ism) or strong sustainable development policies (green policy) are increas-
ingly supported by citizens committed to environmental issues. The 
category of “ecological citizenship” is emerging as a new standard in 
citizenship theory (Dobson, 2003).
The theory of ecological citizenship is a key element for a sustainable 
society, raising again the question we stated at the beginning of this article: 
the necessity of reflecting on the convergence between the eco-ethics of 
our home planet and the bioethics of life.
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